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Remythologising politics   Leave a comment

Roger Haydon Mitchell's Blog

I was recently invited to blog for the exciting Alt Visions Blog that Tim Stacey and Fernande Pool have set up  in order to highlight alternative visions in the public sphere – visions that break with convention to bring new hope for living well together in a divided world. You can find my post on Inseminating Love: Recovering Christian Myths for Deep Structural Political Interventions here http://altvisions.org/

Let me know what you think!

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Posted April 22, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Uncategorized

This Week’s Top Picks in Imperial & Global History   Leave a comment

Imperial & Global Forum

Hans Sloane collected this specimen of cacao in Jamaica in the 1680s. Sloane often collected on or near slave plantations, taking advantage of slavery’s infrastructure to advance his science. NHM IMAGES

Marc-William Palen
History Department, University of Exeter
Follow on Twitter @MWPalen

From how to film a revolution to exposing scientists’ debt to the slave trade, here are this week’s top picks in imperial and global history.

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Posted April 13, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Uncategorized

Brexit to be considered as a lost game   Leave a comment

Marcus Ampe's Space

EU negotiator for Brexit, Michel Barnier, considers Brexit to be a very negative thing, which can be considered as a lost game. For him Brexit has no added value. He says

So far no one, including Mr. Farage, has been able to give any proof of the value of Brexit.”

European Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, finds also that we have lost a lot of valuable time which could be en spend at better things. After years of debates and negotiations, for her it is getting time to stop talking about Brexit, to continue advancing on issues of concern to Europeans.

She finds

“We have things to do, and we can not allow the Brexit to overshadow the important things, because they continue to occupy our thoughts, our means of communication …

Precious time that the heads of State and Government could use to talk to each other about what…

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Posted April 13, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Uncategorized

Time to get out of the gridlock   Leave a comment

Marcus Ampe's Space

In the wee small hours of the morning, Donald Trump lashed out, once more, at the EU over Brexit, responding to the news the UK would be given a “flextension” to 31 October to sort out its nightmarishly chaotic divorce from continental Europe.

According to Trump the Union does not want to give some breath to the UK and for him it is

“Too bad that the European Union is being so tough on the United Kingdom and Brexit.”

but he warns us with his known rhetoric

“Sometimes in life you have to let people breathe before it all comes back to bite you!”

We have no idea how much this time Donald Trump really knows what is going on in Europe and why he would consider the European Union giving an unfair treatment to those who want to leave the Union.

To the Americans he loves to present the…

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Posted April 11, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Uncategorized

Documenting Dialogues: The Roots & Growth of Modern Islam – Part Two.   Leave a comment

hungarywolf

Dualities of  ‘Jihad’ – ‘The Lesser’ & ‘The Greater’:

Jihad, like fatwa, was an Arabic term which entered the contemporary lexicon because of its use by modern Islamist movements, some of which were engaged in the ‘resistance struggle’ against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the decade-long war there, and others who, since earlier in that decade, were actively involved in terrorism, kidnapping and other violent activities. Its primary meaning is ‘exertion’ or ‘striving’, however, and its use in traditional Islamic discourse is very far from the military contexts with which it has become associated in the West, where its translation as ‘holy war’ has been particularly unhelpful. In reality, many forms of activity are included under the term in Islam, and in its most classical formulations the individual believer may undertake ‘jihad’ by his heart; his tongue; his hands; and by the sword – in that order…

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Posted April 7, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Uncategorized

Documenting Dialogues: The Roots & Growth of Modern Islam – Part One.   Leave a comment

hungarywolf

Inter-Religious Literacy & Inter-Cultural Education:

In September 1982, I began training to become a teacher of Religious Education at Trinity College Carmarthen, then part of the University of Wales, now part of St. David’s University. I gained my PGCE (teaching qualification) the following summer and began teaching History and RE in a Church of England High School in Lancashire in September 1983. Before 1982, all I knew about Islam had been picked up from my Muslim friends at the inner-city school I attended in Birmingham, where the compulsory RE curriculum had been focused entirely on Christianity, taught by the choirmaster of St. Martin’s in the Bull Ring, and the GCE ‘O’ Level and ‘A’ Level syllabuses involved simple textual studies of the Old and New Testaments. My History courses at school and university only ever referred to Muslims as medieval Saracens and early modern invaders of Europe, with the Ottoman…

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Posted April 7, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Uncategorized

Documenting Dialogues: The Roots & Growth of Modern Islam – Part One.   1 comment

Inter-Religious Literacy & Inter-Cultural Education:

In September 1982, I began training to become a teacher of Religious Education at Trinity College Carmarthen, then part of the University of Wales, now part of St. David’s University. I gained my PGCE (teaching qualification) the following summer and began teaching History and RE in a Church of England High School in Lancashire in September 1983. Before 1982, all I knew about Islam had been picked up from my Muslim friends at the inner-city school I attended in Birmingham, where the compulsory RE curriculum had been focused entirely on Christianity, taught by the choirmaster of St. Martin’s in the Bull Ring, and the GCE ‘O’ Level and ‘A’ Level syllabuses involved simple textual studies of the Old and New Testaments. My History courses at school and university only ever referred to Muslims as medieval Saracens and early modern invaders of Europe, with the Ottoman Empire ‘knocking at the gates of Vienna’. It was only later when teaching the Schools’ Council’s Medicine Through Time History syllabus in Lancashire that I discovered the extent to which Islamic scholars had kept classical scientific and medical knowledge alive throughout the ‘Dark Ages’ and the period of ‘the Inquisition’. For my pupils in a semi-rural part of Lancashire which had seen little immigration, ‘Muslims’ were people who lived in the old mill towns which, though only fifteen miles away, might just as well have been on a parallel planet. They were seen as objects of fun by the children, though there were one or two ‘National Front’ supporters among the staff. However, because we were a progressive Church school, all forms of racism were challenged, and we deliberately developed a multi-faith syllabus from 11-14, which involved a detailed understanding of both Judaism and Islam, including visits to places of worship. I remember one Pakistani boy joining my class, but when I left in 1986, there were no more than a handful of similar pupils in the school. In Coventry, where I went next, there were many more Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus in our classrooms, and the syllabus reflected this.

BELOW: Fig. 1 – Islamic Culture;

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Above: Inter-Connecting Aspects of Islamic Culture (SHAP Working Party Handbook)

The diagram above is taken from a book, first published in 1977 by the Commission for Racial Equality, lent to me by a friend from teacher-training college (I was never very good at returning books!) It was put together by the SHAP Working Party on World Religions in Education, and edited by the RE ‘guru’, W. Owen Cole. Entitled World Religions: A Handbook for Teachers, it was already in its fourth edition by 1982 and was full of resource lists and activities for teachers with varying knowledge of world religions and limited know-how when it came to teaching about them in primary and secondary schools. Since the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus and Handbook were published in 1975, there had been some polarisation among RE teachers, some of it caused by unsatisfactory reporting in the UK press. Although the need for internationalization of syllabuses was emphasised by the immigration to countries like Britain from Africa and Asia, where Christians were in a minority, in other countries like Sweden where changes were made, there were then very few Hindu, Buddhist or Muslim pupils at that time. The motivation for change came rather from the pupils themselves, whose home backgrounds were increasingly ‘secularised’ or ‘unchurched’. They and their parents asked for more equality in the treatment of religions in school. They accepted the need for studies of existing religions but denied that there should be a bias towards Christianity. Television, increasingly delivered, in the 1980s, by satellite from around the world, informed pupils that Europe with its inherited Christian religion was only a small part of the world, so that they, together with parents and teachers, saw the need to move from an ethnocentric to a more international, intercontinental and inter-faith curriculum in all school subjects.

BELOW: MAP 1;

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Above: Muslims in the World in the Year 2000

However, in tackling problems of immigration and integration, it also seemed a good thing that the teaching of religion in school should already be fundamentally inter-religious. The model adopted for the teaching of religion in school was one which both immigrants of various faiths and indigenous people of mainly Christian beliefs or of none, were able to accept: teaching about and of religions. Adherents of non-Christian beliefs were not always able to accept this model, however. Many Muslims maintained that the whole content of religious teaching had to be based on the Qur’an. In Britain, they continued to teach Muslim children separately, in mosques and Islamic centres, after school hours, though they did not withdraw them from statutory RE in schools. There were also ‘conservative’ Christian groups which opposed this development. In Sweden, for example, they looked back to a time when Luther’s catechism dominated the teaching of religion.

While teaching in Coventry, in 1987 I was invited by the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in the West Midlands of England to organise a ‘Peace Education Project’ based in the Selly Oak Colleges in Birmingham. That brought me into contact with many Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Humanist forums involved in inter-faith dialogue and Religious Education/ Global Education initiatives in schools and colleges throughout the region. As teams of teachers, we developed inter-cultural programmes in parallel in both Northern Ireland and West Midland secondary schools bridging (in the former) the sectarian divide and (in the latter) the ‘inner-city immigrant’/ suburban ‘white flight’ divide. The teachers involved in the programme in the West Midlands were concerned that their students should be given opportunities to explore the multicultural nature of society in the West Midlands constructively and creatively. There were large numbers of people of Asian and Afro-Caribbean heritage throughout the region, but the concentration of these ethnic minorities in particular areas meant that the schools involved were based in suburban communities containing a predominantly ‘white’, upwardly mobile working-class population, much of which had migrated from the multi-cultural ‘inner-city’ areas. It was thus considered important to enable the students to come to terms with their own fears and prejudices in this context. The module we developed had four main objectives:

(1) to raise awareness of conflict at the inter-personal and community levels;

(2) to raise awareness of the factors which generate/ escalate conflict in society e.g. prejudice, labelling, injustice, structural violence;

(3) to develop skills and attitudes in the handling of conflict situations e.g. assertiveness, affirmation, tolerance, mutual respect, co-operation;

(4) to enable pupils to develop for themselves their own creative responses to conflict.

The module used a pack of photographs, The World in Birmingham, which elicited responses to various images of contemporary Birmingham. When the photographs were collected in at the end of one session, some with images of Muslims had been marked with red-tip pen in ‘bullet points’. The materials encouraged the students to look at labelling, stereotyping and prejudice in a variety of ways which involved them in being given a real sense of discrimination through role-playing. This was then linked to an examination of the way in which groups of people and whole communities were often labelled and stereotyped. In particular, the students were given opportunities to explore and criticise popularly held images of Handsworth in Birmingham, the scene of serious rioting in 1985 involving the Afro-Caribbean community. Later, and for the publication of the resulting module pack, Conflict and Reconciliation by the Christian Education Movement in 1991, the ‘community’ study was replaced by materials showing Muslim life in Derby. At a primary level, we also worked in schools with large Muslim and Sikh majorities on ‘peacemaking skills’.

For the following five years I continued to be engaged with these projects, both in the UK and in Hungary, where, due to its forty years as a ‘People’s Republic’, there was no RE curriculum, though there was a growing interest in Peace and Global Education, including international exchange projects funded through the EU’s TEMPUS programme. Teachers are, then, necessarily engaged in the task of working out in detail and practice the values appropriate for a multi-cultural society which seeks to reconcile the maintenance of social harmony with the continuance of cultural diversity. In the 1980s and ’90s, it was obvious that this would not be achieved in the short-term or by good intentions alone. Thought, experience and judgment were required. In helping children to formulate and clarify their own values, teachers need continually to re-examine their own. A great deal depended on the primary school teacher, whose many responsibilities include guiding the child’s first steps into the world of organised social existence.

The Satanic Verses Affair, 1989:

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As Douglas Murray has pointed out recently (2017) almost nobody would have predicted in the 1980s that the first decades of the twenty-first century in Europe would be riven by discussions about religion. The increasingly secular continent had expected to be able to leave faith behind it or had at least recognised that after many centuries the place of religion in the modern state had been pretty much settled. If anybody in the latter part of the twentieth century had said that the early years of the next century in Europe would be rife with discussions about blasphemy and that death for blasphemers would once again have to be accepted in Europe, any audience would have scorned the prediction and doubted the sanity of the claimant. It was not that the ‘early warning sirens’ that went off were not heard, the problem was that they were so consistently ignored by so many outside the faith organisations. Britain had one of the earliest warnings, on Valentine’s Day 1989, when the Supreme Leader of the Revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a document calling on ‘all zealous Muslims of the World’ to know that:

…the author of the book entitled ‘The Satanic Verses’ – which had been compiled, printed and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet and the Qur’an – and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its contents, are sentenced to death. … I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they may be found, so that no one else will dare to insult the Muslim sanctities.

The head of a Tehran ‘charitable foundation’ followed this up with a $ 3 million reward for the British novelist’s murder (the bounty to be reduced to $ 2 million if the murderer were a non-Muslim). Britain and the rest of Europe learned the word fatwa for the first time. Within less than twenty-four hours Rushdie was in hiding, with protection provided by the British State. Soon thousands of British Muslims were demonstrating on the streets for the imposition of Islamic blasphemy laws in Britain. In Bradford, in the north of England, the novel was nailed to a piece of wood and burnt in front of thousands. Across the cultural and political worlds, people debated the reawakening question of blasphemy. On both sides of the political spectrum, there were those who believed that the novelist had transgressed the rules of courtesy. Lord Dacre (the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper) told a newspaper that he “would not shed a tear if some British Muslims, deploring his manners, should… seek to improve them.” The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, also went on television to condemn the author, and even the Prince of Wales was said to have said in private that Rushdie had deserved this condemnation. Those of us involved with him in delicate inter-faith relations in Birmingham were certainly irate at what the novelist had written. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, said that he “understood the Muslims’ feelings.” The Chief Rabbi, Immanuel Jakobovits, said that “both Mr Rushdie and the Ayatollah have abused the freedom of speech.” There were similar pronouncements from the leadership of the Catholic Church and the other denominations. The author John le Carré declared that “there is no law in life or nature that says great religions may be insulted with impunity”.

Undoubtedly, some of the reaction on both sides of the argument was ‘over the top’, but it did demonstrate that there were many in Britain who were prepared to uphold the right to religious faith more highly than the dubious rights of those who were determined to attack and ridicule it. Thanks to the protection measures put around Rushdie, he survived the fatwa, but there were many in the publishing industry and more widely in British society who ‘internalized’ it. Things that were published before 1989 would not be published again, and it became generally accepted that the founder of Islam was not a subject to be written or spoken of lightly or offensively. But the Rushdie affair also had the negative effect of making British society internalise the threat of violence from the radical Islam of the Iranian state. More positively, it ensured that British Muslims were better represented through the creation of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) and later to the creation of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), now the largest umbrella group representing British Muslims. The group was financially supported by Saudi Arabia, then vying with Iran to be the dominant Muslim power, In the short-term, the creation of such groups benefited community relations as more liberal elements within the Islamic community, including some of those who had engaged with us in Christian-Muslim relations in Birmingham, came to the fore. We succeeded in establishing the first initial training course for Muslim teachers in 1991.

The creation of these representative groups also appeared useful for the government. Michael Howard, the Conservative Home Secretary, encouraged the creation of the MCB and made it the interlocutory group for the government. The success of the model led to it being exported to other Western countries, including France, where – despite its secular traditions – Nicolas Sarkozy encouraged the formation of representative bodies for French Muslims, most notably the Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman (CFCM). But in the longer-term, the model favoured those in ‘the Muslim Community’ who were already politically active and engaged, while disadvantaging those too busy with their businesses to bother with community politics. This meant that the Pakistani Islamist group, Jamaat-e-Islami became the dominant group within these councils and that their brand of sectarian politics, often unpopular in their country of origin, became the mainstream voice for Muslims in Europe to the exclusion of more moderate ones. The Satanic Verses affair was, according to Rushdie himself, and in the opinion of many others, the prelude to the ‘main event’ which was to come twelve years later, on 11 September 2001, with the advent and impact of ‘Islamic’ terrorism.

The Five Pillars & Ten Forms of Religious Action:

For centuries Christian and Muslim writers composed imaginary dialogues between members of different faiths to explore, present and refute points of theology. St John of Damascus (d. 748) composed a dialogue on the divinity of Christ, which Muslims reject along with the doctrine of the Trinity, and the problem of free will, intending that this should be used as a manual for the guidance of Christians engaged in debate with learned Muslims. The differences over these questions are perhaps more apparent to Muslims than to Christians. Islam tends to be thought of by Muslims as a correction of Judaism and Christianity. For this reason, the differences tend to lie more in what Islam rejects as false rather than what it asserts as true. For example, Muslims accept the doctrines of a Day of Judgment, the forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the body. But although Islam shares the same dramatic emphasis on the Day of Judgment with Judaism and Christianity, it also stresses that mankind lives in the here and now, and that the mutual obligations between fellow humans should discourage ascetic withdrawal. The concepts of obligation and ‘right action’ can be traced out in terms of family, community and state. The essential point is that a spiritual dimension is an integral part of ‘the good life’. Besides their common historical roots, therefore, all three faiths of the ‘One God’ share fundamental doctrinal beliefs.

The problem of implicit value judgements has already been mentioned, but it is compounded by the tendency of Christian scholars to apply Christian concepts to the analysis of phenomena within Islam. Thus one eminent authority observes that Islam has a defective conception of sin. While this may well be so from the point of view of Christian dogma, ‘sin’ does not occupy the same place in the thought of Islam as it does in the Judeo-Christian tradition. We may wish to understand why this may be so, but we will not attain that understanding by labelling a particular belief or practice as ‘defective’ or ‘distorted’. Understanding can better be reached by accepting the methodological criteria for ‘Comparative Religion’ advocated by Michael Pye:

(1) a temporary suspension of presuppositions and conclusions about the truth, falsity, value or otherwise of a given set of concepts and actions, and…

(2) the attempt to elucidate as fully as possible what the concepts, actions, social associations and states of mind mean for the persons involved in them.

009

We could usefully adopt Pye’s categorising framework of ‘Religious Action; Groups; States of Mind; Concepts’ as an approach in our own dialogues with Islam. The category of ‘Religious Action’ can be sub-divided as follows:

1. Special Places, Times and Objects;

Places – e.g. Ka’aba stone, Mosques, Tombs;

Times – e.g. Friday prayers, Ramadan, Dhul-Hajj;

Objects – e.g. Qur’an;

2. The Use of the Body (e.g. prayer rituals, asceticism and fasting);

3. Separation and Ritual Cleansing (e.g. ablutions, diet, pollution & purification);

4. Sacrifice, Offering & Worship (atonement, thanksgiving, celebration);

5. Rehearsal of Significant Past or Myth (especially important for Shia);

6. Meditation & Prayer;

Thanksgiving – for the revelation given to the prophet;

Adoration – of God & his works;

Pledges – to uphold ethical standards;

7. Seeking Specific Benefits (rain, victory, wealth, health or exorcism);

8. Occasional Rites ( e.g. rites of passage, work, hunting, building, harvesting);

9. Ethics & Society (Islam lays great emphasis on the link between religion & correct social relations and thus clearly defines roles and approved patterns of behaviour);

10. Propagation (the organised missionary method of the Christian churches c.f. more informal process of proselytising in Islam).

In the 1980s, British teachers of RE were becoming increasingly familiar with such phrases as ‘pluralism’, ‘multi-cultural society’ and ‘mutual respect’. The were occurring, with ever-growing frequency, in speeches made by politicians and pundits, newspaper editorials and the reports of numberless committees and working parties. By the turn of the century, they had fossilised into meaningless clichés because they failed to acquire a more precise and comprehensive usage with clear implications for action and practice. ‘Respect’ came to mean merely avoiding open disrespect for the beliefs and customs of others, whereas Mutual Understanding, the phrase used in Northern Ireland’s schools, meant making a positive effort to achieve a genuine empathy for different cultural values and actively seeking accommodation between those values and our own. This was a more inter-cultural approach, more about integration rather than assimilation, and one which also suited our needs in the West Midlands. But while the two Christian traditions in Northern Ireland traced their conflict back to the sixteenth century, it was not so clear how such ‘accommodation’ could be truly mutual in a European society whose overall framework bore with it the marks of fifteen hundred years of dominant Christian values, assumptions, taboos, customs and prejudices. The following ‘approach’ to teaching and learning ‘about Islam’ suggests potential paths towards ‘mutual understanding’ and inter-faith dialogue:

BELOW: FIG. 2;

003

This heritage, whatever we might have thought about the contemporary state of institutionalised Christianity, was still a living heritage and an active component of our daily lives and thoughts and actions. Not so with Islam, at least not in Britain. This Christian heritage may have been all but invisible to most people in Britain at the turn of the century, but those brought up in a different tradition would have had less difficulty in perceiving it. As a people, the late twentieth century British did not seem to care too much for abstractions. Some teachers were therefore either suspicious or uncomfortable with the idea that they should be teaching ‘values’. But values were very commonplace in the school playground; ‘fairness’, ‘trust’ and ‘sharing’ were simple, integrating concepts with a wealth of childhood experience defining them. Islam as a faith is synonymous with ‘sharing’ and can be related both to the overtly religious experiences which bind the believer to God and to the ethical prescriptions which bind that believer to his/ her fellows. The Five Pillars of the Faith – summarised below – can be presented in the light of this concept of ‘sharing’:

(1) Shahada: The Profession of Faith, according to the formula There is no god but God. Muhammad is the Messenger of God. To this, the Shi’i minority add: Ali is the Friend of God. It must be made in the presence of other believing Muslims. It is whispered in the ear of a new-born baby. These acts represent the sharing of knowledge of God’s truth revealed to Mankind;

010 (2)

(2) Salat: Prayer – may be individual, but is more often communal and on Fridays at noon is congregational, when all adult male members of the community are gathered. Males and females are usually separated, with women worshipping behind the men or in a screened-off section of the mosque. It takes the form of a ritual prostration in which the precise bodily movements are as important as the accompanying mental activity. Sunni Muslims are required to perform salat five times daily – at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and evening. Worshippers must be in a state of ritual purity achieved by performing major or minor ablutions, depending on the degree of pollution brought about by bodily secretions, sexual activity, contact with animals and so on. Salat may be performed virtually anywhere, provided the worshipper faces the qibla, the direction of the Ka’aba in Makka. Muslims share the experience of worship on Fridays when a sermon is usually delivered by the Imam or prayer-leader;

(3) Sawm: Fasting during Ramadam. The fast, which takes place during daylight hours in the holy month of Ramadam, the ninth month of the lunar calendar, applies to eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual activity. The fast begins at dawn and ends at sunset. In Muslim countries such as Egypt, the breaking of the fast at sundown is an occasion for joyful celebration, with tables laid out in the streets and feasting that carries on well into the night. A pre-fast meal is usually served before dawn. Ramadam is traditionally an occasion for both family get-togethers and religious reflection. It is considered especially meritorious to recite the whole of the Qur’an during the sacred month. According to tradition, the Qur’an ‘came down’ on 27 Ramadan, the ‘Night of Power’. During fasting, the individual feels the pangs of hunger but does so as a member of an entire community which is fasting. The experience enables him to share the sufferings of the poor and hungry. The ending of the fast is marked by a great communal festival (Eid al-Fitr);

(4) Zakat: Alms-giving/ Compulsory Charity. This tax, payable once a year by all adult Muslims, is assessed at 2.5 per cent of capital assets over and above a minimum known as the nisab. For example, the nisab for livestock consists of five camels, thirty cows, or forty sheep or goats. It is also payable on bank deposits, precious metals, merchandise used in trade (but not personal possessions) and crops from tilled land. The recipients should be the poor and needy. In the past, zakat was collected by the Muslim governments and distributed according to prescribed patterns, but in modern times it has usually been a matter for the believer’s conscience. Thus, the giving of alms exemplifies very clearly the Islamic obligation to share one’s property with others. Numerous quotations can be shared from the Qur’an relating to the duty to care for widows, orphans, etc. The institution of waqf should also be mentioned here, an endowment made by a Muslim to a religious, educational, or charitable cause;

011

(5) Hajj: The pilgrimage to Makka is a great spiritual experience in which the individual and collective aspects cannot be separated. It is an intense and demanding religious obligation, required of every adult Muslim at least once in his or her lifetime. The annual pilgrimage takes place during the last ten days of the twelfth lunar month (Dhu’l al-Hijja) reaching its climax with the Feast of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha), a festival honoured throughout the Muslim world with the slaughter of a specially fattened sheep, cow or camel in commemoration of the Sacrifice of Abraham. The ‘minor pilgrimage’, or ‘Umra, may be performed at any time of the year. In the past, Muslims from far-flung regions would spend the best part of a lifetime on the journey, working their way across Africa or Asia to reach the Holy City. On their return they enjoyed the honoured status of Hajji – one who has made the pilgrimage. By meeting together at Mecca Muslims can share their sense of belonging to a worldwide community, the umma, which embraces all believers. Sharing the hazards and expenses of a long journey also reinforces this experience. The diagram below (fig. 3) shows how the Islamic metaphor of an ‘inner journey’, or Haqiqah, can be explored in relation to the physical pilgrimage, or Hajj.

FIG. 3; ALTERNATIVE METAPHORS (II) – THE ‘INNER JOURNEY’

004

The concept of sharing can be explored further by examining how, in the Middle Ages, Muslims shared useful knowledge with the peoples they came into contact with, e.g. new crops, irrigation systems, medical and architectural techniques, Arabic numerals, etc. It is also important to emphasise that Muslims do not simply share experiences, beliefs and goods with each other, but they also share the following beliefs and values with both Christians and Jews:

(a) a belief in the One God as Creator and Guide;

(b) a concern for weaker members of the community;

(c) a duty to deal justly and kindly with fellow human beings;

(d) delight in the beauty of the natural world.

Images of Islam & Muslim Identities:

In 2000, I received a copy of a small book by Malise Ruthven with my copy of The Times Higher Education Supplement called Islam: A Very Short Introduction. At the time, I regarded it as a useful addition to my collection of small reference books, but I have since lent it to several friends who have engaged me in discussions of the role of Islam in the modern world, especially since the attacks on Washington and New York of 11th September 2001. Even before what has become known as 9/11, when I was teaching international students including Muslims at a Quaker school in Britain, Islam was seen by many as a hostile force, a possible replacement for communism as the main ideological challenge to post-Enlightenment liberalism. When we opened any newspaper or turned on the radio or television (in a time before social media added another dimension to political and educational discourse), there were stories about Islam. Many of these were accompanied by images of violence, whether from Kashmir, Bosnia, Algeria or Palestine. These images of Islam were usually of a hard, uncompromising faith whose adherents would resort to violence in defence of their principles or in order to impose their will on others. Yet for those of us more familiar with Muslims and their traditions over the previous quarter century or more, the image of ‘militant Islam’ was at odds with the faith that most of its adherents would regard as no less pacific than Buddhism or Christianity. The word ‘Islam’ in Arabic means ‘self-surrender’ and is closely related, etymologically, to Salaam, the word for ‘peace’. The universal greeting with which Muslims address each other, and foreigners, is as-Salaam ‘Alaikum – ‘Peace be upon you’.

In the eyes of many Muslims, this was a distorted image in the Western media. In an age of sound-bites and newspaper headlines driven by tabloid sales, the lives and values of peace-loving majorities were inevitably obscured by the attention-seeking acts of noisy minorities. The news media acted as a distorting mirror at a fairground, exaggerating the militancy of the few while minimising the quietism or indifference of the many. Samuel Huntingdon, a Harvard professor, stated that Islam has bloody borders and predicted that there would be a clash of civilisations between Islam, ‘the West’ and China after the collapse of Marxism-Leninism. Fred Halliday, a perceptive observer of world affairs, wrote that:

… the myth of confrontation is sustained from two apparently contradictory sides – from the camp of those, mainly in the West, seeking to turn the Muslim world into another enemy, and from those within the Islamic countries who advocate confrontation with the non-Muslim, particularly Western, world.

Defining Islam is far from a simple matter. Using Western categories that may be alien to Muslim perceptions, Islam may be defined as both a religion and a political ideology; it is also, in some contexts, a mark of personal and group identity. These three definitions neither exclude nor include each other. As already noted above, ‘Islam’ in Arabic is a verbal noun or gerund, meaning ‘surrendering to God’ as revealed through the message and the life of the prophet, Muhammad. In its primary meaning, as employed in the Qur’an and other foundational texts, the word ‘Muslim’ refers to one who so surrenders himself or herself, from the active participle of the verb aslama, ‘to surrender oneself’. It also has a secondary meaning, referring to one who takes on their parent’s confessional identity without necessarily subscribing to the beliefs and practices of the faith, just as a Jew may define herself as ‘Jewish’ without observing the Halacha. In non-Muslim societies, these Muslims may subscribe to, and be vested with, secular identities. The Muslim population of Bosnia, descendants of Slavs who converted to Islam under the Ottoman rule, were not always noted for their attendance at prayers, abstention from alcohol, seclusion of women, and other social practices associated with believing Muslims in other parts of the world. They were officially designated as ‘Muslims’ in order to distinguish them from the mainly ‘Orthodox’ Serbs and ‘Catholic’ Croats under the former Yugoslav Republic. The ‘label’ therefore applied to their ethnic identity, rather than to their faithfulness to the religion.

In this limited context, which could also be applied to many of the second and third generations of immigrants from ‘Muslim societies’, there was no contradiction between being ‘culturally’ Muslim and simultaneously an atheist or agnostic. This is also the case with the word ‘Jewish’, but the adjective ‘Christian’ can only strictly be applied to a confessional identity. However, the secular definition of ‘Muslim’ has been rejected by modern Muslim scholars have tended to redraw the boundaries between themselves and ‘nominal’ Muslims, even going so far as to describe the latter as ‘infidels’ (i.e. ‘outside the faith’). Similarly, ‘evangelicals’ among Christians have reappropriated the word ‘Christian’ to apply solely to those who accept Jesus as Messiah, rather than accepting its use as a means of nominal reference to Western culture as predominantly Christian. Generally, there has been little consistency in the way such nomenclature has been used. Where ‘Muslims’, however secular or ‘cultural’, were beleaguered, as in Bosnia, rhetorical generosity would include them among the believers.

Identifying Islam as a Faith without Leadership:

No less than other successful modern religions, Islam contains a rich repertoire of concepts, symbols and spiritual disciplines through which believers maintain their identities and sense of being in the world, their sense of being in contact with God. The crisis many Muslims were facing at the turn of the millennium was not the result of some inherent lack of flexibility in the realm of ideas. Historically, Islam has shown enormous flexibility in adjusting to the complexities of the contemporary world and in accommodating different cultural systems within its overarching framework: the Abrahamic ‘family’ of western Asian monotheism which includes Judaism and Christianity as well as Islam, as one of three world faiths with a common familial ancestor and origin. The crisis of modern Islam (and few denied that such a crisis existed two decades ago, and still does) was not so much a ‘spiritual crisis’ as a crisis of authority – political, intellectual and legal as well as spiritual. The best community or umma ordained by God for enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong – a community that successfully conducted its affairs for fifteen centuries without external interference – demanded leadership. Yet outside the ‘Shi’ite’ minority tradition in Iran, a leadership commanding universal support among Muslims of all traditions was conspicuously absent.

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Above: The Rise and Spread of Islam

There is no ‘church’ in Islam, no formally instituted body empowered to supervise or dictate the religious agenda, to articulate an ‘official’ Islamic view comparable to that of the Papacy, Bishops, Synods and Moderators, nor even Chief Rabbis. With the collapse of the Islamic superstate that lasted barely two centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (see the map above), religious authority was entrusted to the ‘ulama (‘learned men’), a class of scholars whose role as guardians and interpreters of the tradition is much closer to those of the Pharisaic rabbis in Judaism than that of a Christian ‘apostolic succession’. They did not exercise political power but acted as a break on the power of the rulers, the sultans (‘authorities’) and amirs (‘commanders’), most of whom came to power by force of arms, interpreting and administering the divine law according to complex rules developed in the academies. The most prestigious of these academies, Al-Azhar in Cairo, was founded in AD 971 and claims to be the oldest university in the world. Though its rector enjoys a pre-eminent position in ‘Sunni’ Islam, his decisions are not binding on his peers. Similarly, although all Muslim governments appointed an official mufti from among the ‘ulama, his opinions were purely consultative unless supported in court by a judge, placing religious law under the law of the state. Mass education policies were undertaken by most post-colonial governments, thus short-circuiting the traditional body of scholarship surrounding the interpretation of the sacred texts, leading to a crisis of intellectual authority and a failure by the ‘ulama to incorporate reformist thinking into their discourse.

‘Islamism’ as a Political Ideology:

The word ‘fundamentalist’ had passed into English usage as a term of abuse, whether applied to faithful Christians or Muslims, but by the end of the century it also became applied to Muslims who sought to establish an ‘Islamic state’. According to this view, it was the task of the Islamic state to enforce obedience to the revealed law of Islam – the Shari’a. The term ‘fundamentalist’ is problematic because of its Christian origins. Fundamentalism was originally a theological movement directed against liberal or modernist theology, in particular, those teachings that questioned literal understandings of ‘supernatural’ events such as the six-day creation, the virgin birth and the physical resurrection of Christ. Muslim writers and scholars described as ‘fundamentalist’ have all adopted some modernistic and allegorical interpretations of the Qur’an which, as demonstrated above, is full of metaphor anyway. At the same time, all believing Muslims, not just those described as ‘fundamentalists’, have continued to see the Qur’an as the eternal, unmediated word of God. As Ruthven has pointed out:

The focus for those seeking to defend Islam against what they see as the corrupting effects of modern secularism and the ‘West’ is action rather than belief. This agenda, however novel its methods of application (including the adoption of terrorist methods), generally accords with long-established historical patterns. Throughout history Islamic rectitude has tended to be defined in relation to practice rather than doctrine. … It is in enforcing behavioural conformity (orthopraxy) rather than in doctrinal conformity (orthodoxy) that Muslim radicals or activists look to a ‘restoration’ of Islamic law backed by the power of the state.

The means adopted towards achieving this end, however, varied greatly according to the political and institutional contexts of the countries in which it took shape and form. In Jordan, Muslim radicals sat as parliamentary representatives, but the democratic system was adopted purely as a means to an end in which it would be rejected; in Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Egypt, they were involved in armed conflict with the state; in Pakistan and more recently in Sudan, they exercised power on the backs of military dictatorships; in Iran they operated under a hybrid system, sitting as parliamentary representatives chosen from a restricted list of like-minded candidates. Most ‘militant’ Muslims challenged the fundamentals of the international order. They aimed to replace the sovereignty of the people expressed through parliamentary law-makers, with the ‘sovereignty of God’ as revealed, in its perfection and finality, through the Shari’a law. The many critics of this approach directed their fire at two of its arguments. Firstly, they pointed out that, historically, no Islamic society, even during the high tide of the Ottoman Empire, was governed exclusively according to Shari’a law. There was always a gap between the theoretical formulations of the jurists and the de facto exercise of political power. Moreover, there was always an enormous diversity among Muslim societies, so that everywhere Islamic law was supplemented by local customary laws. Secondly, those who insist on politicising Islam were charged with misrepresentation of the faith. Far from drawing exclusively upon Quranic teaching, the ideology being advanced were hybrids, mixing Islamic ideas with modern totalitarian ones.

Therefore, to refer to modern political Islam as ‘radical’ or ‘fundamentalist’ is not only misleading, but it makes a gratuitous concession to its advocates by implying that the defence of the ‘roots’ or ‘fundamentals’ of Islam invariably demands political action. Muslims who contest this view argue that as long as governments do not prevent the believer from carrying out his or her religious duties, it cannot be described as anti-Islam.

The Growth of Islam & Islamophobia in Europe to 2015:

When the 2001 Census for England and Wales was published the following year, a Times journalist made comments about likely future immigration which were denounced in the House of Commons by the Home Secretary David Blunkett as bordering on fascism. By the time of the next census of 2011 (published at the end of 2012), however, showed that very major ethnic changes had taken place over the decade. But there were equally striking findings about the changing religious make-up of Britain. For instance, they revealed that almost every belief was on the rise except Christianity. Since the previous census, the number of people identifying themselves as Christian had fallen from seventy-two per cent to fifty-nine per cent. The number of Christians in England and Wales had dropped by nearly four million, from thirty-seven million to thirty-three. But while Christianity witnessed this huge collapse in its ‘professing’ followers, one which was only expected to continue, mass migration had led to a dramatic increase in the Muslim population. Between 2001 and 2011 the number of Muslims in England and Wales rose from 1.5 million to 2.7 million. Moreover, the beliefs and values of these recent immigrants were more socially conservative than those of the majority of the population. A Gallup survey conducted in 2009 found that none of the five hundred British Muslims interviewed thought that homosexuality was morally acceptable. Seven years later, another survey found that more than half (52%) of British Muslims thought that homosexuality should be made illegal. The common response to these were that these were the attitudes of many indigenous British people a generation or two previously.

More serious threats to community cohesion were posed by the attitudes of some Muslim communities towards women and teenage girls. From the early 2000s onwards, stories and evidence emerged of organised grooming of often underage girls by gangs of men of Pakistani ‘heritage’ in towns in the north of England. A 2004 television documentary on social services in Bradford had its screening postponed after self-proclaimed ‘anti-fascists’ and local police chiefs appealed to Channel Four to drop the documentary. The sections that dealt with the sexual exploitation of ‘white’ girls by ‘Asian’ gangs were thought to be potentially inflammatory, especially ahead of local elections in which the ‘ultra-right’ British National Party was standing. But everything about this case provided a microcosm of a problem and a reaction which would shortly spread across Europe. Campaigning on, or even mentioning, the issue of grooming during those years brought with it terrible animosity towards those who did so. When the northern Labour MP Ann Cryer took up the issue of the rape of underage girls in her own constituency, she was swiftly and widely denounced as an ‘Islamophobe’ and a ‘racist’, and at one stage had to receive police protection. It took years for the central government, the police, local authorities and the Crown Prosecution Service to face up to the issue. When they finally did so, an official enquiry into abuse in the town of Rotherham alone revealed the sexual exploitation of 1,400 children over the period 1997-2014. The victims were all non-Muslim girls from the local community, the youngest of whom was eleven. The enquiry found that because almost all men were of Pakistani ‘heritage’, the staff at the local council had described their…

… nervousness about identifying the ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought racist; others remembered clear direction from their managers not to do so.

To make matters worse, the communities from which the men came, by then well-established in the town, showed no willingness to confront the problem and every desire to cover it up. Even at the courts, after sentencing, families of those accused claimed that the whole thing was a government ‘stitch-up’ of some kind. Those Muslims who did speak out against the abuse by members of his own community, they received death threats from fellow British Muslims for doing so. The judges who eventually presided over the trials summed up the evidence by stating that the girls were chosen because they were from different communities, non-Muslim and therefore regarded as ‘easy meat’. Many of these men had brought ideas about women and especially about unaccompanied or ‘unprotected’ women with them from Pakistan and other patriarchal Muslim cultures. However, in the face of such attitudes being expressed towards women in the United Kingdom, the British state in all its agencies was clearly culpable in failing to uphold the law of the land and the norms of British society. The British police remained scarred from the Macpherson Report of 1999 which had charged them with ‘institutional racism’ and feared any repeat of such findings.

At the same time, over the course of the 2000s, criticisms of extreme examples of ‘multiculturalism’ in Britain and ‘political correctness’ came from politicians on the left as well as the right. These ‘breakages’, as Douglas Murray has described them, also came from those of ‘ethnic’ backgrounds, like Trevor Phillips, a former National Union of Students colleague of mine, who opened up territory that others had not dared to walk in. His realisation that the race-relations industry was part of the problem, and that partly as a result of talking up ‘diversity’ the country was ‘sleepwalking to segregation’, was an insight that others began to share, not just in Britain, but also across the continent. The emergence of Ahmed Aboutaleb and Ayaan Hirsi in Holland, Nyamki Sabuni in Sweden, Naser Khader in Denmark and Magdi Allam in Italy, had a palpably liberating effect. All spoke from within their communities to countries that needed people to do so with varying degrees of success. In each country, the issues of ‘honour’ killings and female genital mutilation received massive attention. The era of multiculturalism quietly transformed itself into the era of ‘multifaithism’. Ethnic identity began to recede and faith identity, which to many people outside the faith communities seemed to have come from nowhere, instead became the crucial issue. What had been a question of blacks or Caribbeans, North Africans and Pakistanis, now became a question of relations between Christian, Jewish and Muslim ‘cultures’.

Everywhere in Europe concerns over the integration of faith-based immigrant cultures were growing. During these decades in which European governments allowed immigration to run at the levels they did, few if any expected that they would spend the foreseeable future trying to balance Islamic laws and demands with European culture and traditions. Yet, as immigrant populations grew, everywhere the same problems erupted. Sometimes it occurred because of the discovery of what was going on within the new immigrant communities. In the United Kingdom, for example, the police were forced to admit that they had failed to investigate scores of suspicious deaths of young Muslim women because they had thought these potential ‘honour killings’ were community matters. In 2006 the British Medical Association reported that at least 74,000 women in Britain had been subjected to genital mutilation.

Nobody flinched in 2015 at a passing mention in a piece in The Atlantic magazine of Europe’s endless, debilitating blasphemy wars. Despite a couple of decades of warnings, from the Rushdie affair onwards, no one in any position of authority or power had prepared for the possibility the wave of events that followed. Before that affair, no one had ever thought about it as a Muslim issue. No one in Britain had thought that those arriving might not only prove much harder to integrate than the Pakistani Muslims and east African ‘Asians’ of the sixties and seventies but that they would also bring with them many socially conservative with them, or that other religious and ethnic minorities, such as the Jews, might be the first victims of such a lack of foresight. No one in a position of authority had ever predicted that an upsurge in immigration would lead to an increase in anti-Semitism and homophobia. No-one in the post-Christian West, even the religiously literate, had foreseen that ‘blasphemy’ would again become one of the major cultural and security issues of early twenty-first century Europe. Those who had warned about it in public had been ignored, defamed, dismissed, prosecuted or physically attacked. What mainstream politicians and much of the media had done, from the 1990s to the 2010s was to encourage a sense that the people in Europe who were shouting ‘fire’ were the actual arsonists, fanning the flames of Islamophobia rather than seeking to extinguish them. Three decades after the Rushdie affair changed the world, there was almost no one in Europe who would dare write a novel, compose a piece of music or even draw a mildly satirical image that might risk Muslim anger. We went out of our way to show how much we admired Islam but did not apply the same rigorous standards of criticism and that secular society had applied to Christianity decades earlier.

(to be continued… )

Primary Sources:

W. Owen Cole (ed) (1982), World Religions: A Handbook for Teachers. London: The Commission for Racial Equality.

Luc Heymans (ed.) (1989), Trans Europe Peace: Linking bulletin for Peace Education movements among the EEC State members, no. 3, February 1989. Namur: Universite de Paix.

 

 

Posted April 1, 2019 by TeamBritanniaHu in Africa, Anti-racism, anti-Semitism, Arabs, Asia, Assimilation, Belfast, Birmingham, Britain, British history, Brussels, Caribbean, Christian Faith, Christianity, Church, Civil Rights, Civilization, Cold War, Commemoration, Commonwealth, Communism, Conquest, Coventry, decolonisation, Discourse Analysis, Egypt, Empire, eschatology, Ethnicity, Europe, France, History, homosexuality, Hungary, hygeine, Immigration, Integration, Jews, Marxism, Middle East, Migration, monotheism, multiculturalism, Narrative, Population, Racism, Respectability, Social Service, Statehood, Syria, terror, terrorism, theology, Turkey, Uncategorized, United Kingdom, Warfare, West Midlands, xenophobia

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