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The Twin Crises of 1956: Suez & Hungary, part six   1 comment

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Invasion & Miserable Isolation: 2-4 November

By Friday 2 November, Hungary’s five days of freedom, from 28 October to 1 November were effectively over. All Saints’ Day was followed by All Souls’ Day, the Day of the Dead, a day for visiting the graves of departed relatives. The streets in Budapest and elsewhere in the country became appropriately more calm and more sombre, but not just in remembrance of the dead, but also out of fear for the living. Despite the ominous signs of a Soviet return, however, the positive atmosphere of ‘victory’ continued in the capital and negotiations were underway for a return to work and a resumption of services on the following Monday, 5 November. Continuing to hope for the best, on 2 November, Imre Nagy began to construct a new government including three Smallholder, three Social Democratic, two National Peasant and two Communist Party ministers. It resembled the results of the last free election of November 1945. Maléter was named Minister of Defence and János Kádár was also included. By the 3rd, there was an open nationalist rebellion within the newly formed HSWP.  The following radio announcement about the Cabinet ‘reshuffle’ was also made on 3 November:

The composition of the National Government is as follows: Imre Nagy – President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs… János Kádár – Minister of State.

There may have been some significance in Nagy taking over the Foreign Ministry from Kádár, but the latter was still in a very powerful position both in internal and external affairs. There was no indication at that time that he had already sided with the Soviet invaders, yet by that same evening he was already assembling his own Temporary Revolutionary Government of Hungary on Soviet soil just across the Hungarian border with Ukraine. Nagy also made a further complaint to the UN about more Russian tanks entering Hungary.

Having informed other members of the Warsaw Pact of the impending invasion in Brest the previous day, on 2 November Khrushchev entered into negotiations with Tito to secure Yugoslavia’s support in crushing the revolution. In the changing atmosphere of these days, the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov, obviously more aware of the scale of the invasion being planned by Khrushchev, briefly thought that there might be a siege of his embassy. Béla Király, Military Commander of Budapest, wrote (in 1989) of how he received a phone call from Imre Nagy saying that Andropov had called him with the news that a mob was besieging the embassy. Nagy pressed Király to deal with the matter urgently, so the latter organised a group of armed civilians and another one of Hungarian army personnel to go with him. He gave them a briefing about the importance of maintaining diplomatic immunity, pointing out that the Soviets should not be given any excuse to bring their troops back to Budapest. Arriving at the building, Király found no sign of any attacking mob. Andropov made up an improbable story about old ladies seeking accommodation because their flats had been burnt out, but quickly turned the conversation towards the proposed negotiations with the Soviets over their withdrawal of troops. Béla Király suspected that there was some kind of psychological ploy involved in what was, in any case, one of the more bizarre events of these autumn days.

While the talks between Khrushchev and Tito were ongoing, in New York, the Yugoslav Representative to the UN Security Council was sitting between the Hungarian and US Representatives at its meeting on the 2 November to consider the critical situation in Hungary. The US Representative, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, stressed American sympathy for Hungarian independence, dating back to 1848. The next day, he introduced a draft resolution calling on the Soviet Union to desist from any form of intervention, particularly armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary. President Eisenhower announced that the United States would supply Hungary with twenty million dollars worth of emergency food and medical aid through the Red Cross. The Security Council decided to postpone further discussion of the Hungarian Crisis in order to focus on the Suez Crisis.

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On 3 November in Hungary, although reports continued to arrive about the deployment of Soviet troops around the capital, official negotiations began in Parliament about the withdrawal from Hungary of all Soviet forces. They began at mid-day. The Hungarian negotiators, Defence Minister Pál Maléter, Minister of State Ferenc Erdei, and Chief of the General Staff István Kovács awaited their Soviet counterparts, who, according to Tibor Méray, were given full military honours:

The brilliantly bedecked officers, headed by General Malinin who wore a green uniform, his breast covered with decorations, climbed the steps on a thick red carpet.

The talks seemed to be going well. Apart from matters of the transport and provisioning of their withdrawing forces, the Soviet delegation was mainly concerned about ‘technical’ issues such as the repair of Soviet war memorials damaged during the uprising, the future protection of Soviet war graves in Hungary and the type of ceremony to mark the final evacuation of Soviet troops from the country. The Hungarians had no particular objections to any of the proposals. When the session was adjourned, it was agreed that the discussions would continue that night at the Soviet air base at Tököl, on Csepel Island, to the south of the city. A Hungarian convoy arrived just before the agreed time of 10 p.m., with Pál Maléter, Erdei and Kovács, and a fourth member of the team, Colonel Miklós Szücs, Head of Military Operations. They were led to a room where they found only the Soviet interpreter. General Malinin then arrived and sat down in a frosty manner. Hardly had Maléter begun to speak when he was interrupted by Malinin, who said that he hadn’t been able to establish contact with the Soviet government. At that point, the head of the KGB, Ivan Serov, entered the room with several others, pointing pistols at the Hungarians, who were then disarmed and escorted into separate military detention rooms.

Kovács was visited by László Piros, the former interior minister, who had been brought there in anticipation of a Soviet attack and the installation of a new government under János Kádar. Piros informed him of this and told him that he should give orders to the Hungarian Army not to resist the Soviet troops. Kovács refused to give a direct order under duress, but wrote a letter calling for the avoidance of bloodshed between the two armies. The following morning the prisoners were being returned to Budapest, accompanied by Soviet and ÁVH officers, when they were fired upon by Hungarian soldiers and National Guard civilians, killing seven Soviets and four ÁVH men. The Hungarian Army was acting on Maléter’s own orders, given on 1 November. After being returned to the air base near Tököl, the Hungarian negotiators were flown by helicopter to the Soviet base at Mátyásföld, to the east of Pest. From there, they were transferred to a prison in Buda.

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The other major events in Hungary on that day related to Cardinal Mindszenty, who had returned to his Buda residence three days earlier after being released from house arrest. He had issued a short statement on 1 November, lending his support to the struggle for freedom which was unparalleled in world history. On 3 November, he addressed a press conference in the morning in which he withheld his support for the Nagy government until a Christian Democratic Party had been formed and given a voice in the cabinet. Afterwards, in the Kádár era, this was interpreted as clear evidence of Mindszenty’s counter-revolutionary stance. Then he made a live speech on the radio at 8 p.m. in which he called for a revaluation of old-fashioned nationalism. The speech undoubtedly unnerved some members of the Nagy government. What bothered them was the references to the government as the successors to a fallen régime. They suspected that Mindszenty wanted to see their government, or at least the reform communists in it,  fall as well.

On the night of 3 November, while the UN Security Council was in session, a Soviet Army of fifteen divisions and sixty thousand troops, with more than four thousand tanks, was massing along the USSR/ Hungary border. During the night they entered Hungary, surrounded the capital and sealed the country’s borders. An advanced division entered Budapest and occupied the Parliament building.  At dawn the following morning, 4 November, over a thousand Russian tanks entered the city. Shooting began immediately. Tom Leimdorfer takes up the story from the civilian point of view:

In the early hours of Sunday, 4th November, we woke to sounds of explosions and heard the rumbling of tanks. We turned on the radio just in time to hear the unforgettable broadcast words of Imre Nagy:

‘Today at daybreak Soviet forces started an attack against our capital, obviously with the intention to overthrow the legal Hungarian democratic government. Our troops are fighting. The government is in its place. I notify the people of our country and the entire world of this fact.’

Nagy vowed not to surrender, but soon took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, where he was to stay for over two weeks. Early the same morning, the new cabinet member István Bibó visited the US Legation with a message asking President Eisenhower to call on the Soviet Union to withdraw, noting the American Liberation Policy which was pursued with so much firmness and wisdom.  Two hours after Nagy’s statement, Radio Budapest broadcast an SOS signal, “Help Hungary! Help! Help!” and then went off the air. Many Hungarians, buoyed up by the promises of Radio Free Europe, were still certain that the West would come to their aid, and Tom recalls listening to the plaintiff voices of intellectuals before the radio building was captured:

This was followed over the next three hours by pleas for help from the West from organisations of writers, academics. Then the radio went dead, then some music was broadcast.

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But no support was forthcoming, except in the form of a strong protest from the White House to the Kremlin. Cardinal Mindszenty and his secretary left Parliament and arrived at the US Legation, which granted them refuge, though the secretary later left and was captured by Hungarian security forces. The Cardinal also asked for American assistance in defence of Hungary. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were deeply concerned but, distracted by the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt and the approaching climax of the national elections, they did nothing except loudly condemn the Soviet action in the final speeches of the campaign. Despite Soviet claims that the West was behind the rising, in reality the Western powers had clearly been caught by surprise by the sequence of events. Britain and France were preoccupied, and the US the stakes of intervention were too high. The National Security Council concluded that there could be no American military or political intervention in the affairs of Soviet satellites, no ventures behind the Iron Curtain. As with Poland, Eisenhower and Dulles realised that they could not risk a nuclear war over the fate of an East European nation. As the citizens of Budapest, like Tom and his mother, crouched in their cellars once more, they most were realistic about their future:    

The shelling came closer. When one shell exploded nearby, we all rushed out of flats and down the stairs to the cellars below our block. Indomitable as ever, Mami was telling me what it was like 12 years before when she was sheltering with me (aged two) during the siege of Budapest in the winter of 1944/45. We listened to the roar of tanks going past the block, presumably towards the Parliament. Everyone was sombre. We all knew this was the end of the revolution. Some talked of help from the West, but most knew it was impossible. The West was busy with Suez and certainly nobody wanted a nuclear war.

The United States, in practice, could not embark on ‘rollback’ and would have to settle for continued ‘containment’. The Hungarian people were abandoned in their hour of need, and left to defend themselves. The Soviet forces met little resistance from the Hungarian Army units, but considerable resistance from armed civilian groups, which was to continue for several days. Most foreign journalists abandoned the Duna Hotel and sought refuge in various embassies before leaving the country. Tom Leimdorfer expresses how isolated and alienated everyone felt:

When the shelling died down, we crept up to our flats again. No lights were switched on, we tried to get a makeshift meal in the dark and stay away from the window.  We spent the next day in miserable isolation, trying to get some news over the phone, rushing down to the cellar again for a brief period when we heard tank shells nearby.

Determined this time to avoid any risk of fraternization with the rebels, the Soviets sent in tanks rather than infantry against the Hungarians, and staffed them with crews from the non-Russian-speaking republics. The Kremlin also realised that they had picked the wrong man in Imre Nagy. Soviet ambassador  Andropov had switched his support to János Kádár as the leader who would restore authority and guarantee loyalty to the cause of international communism. As Nagy went into hiding with some of his supporters in the Yugoslav Embassy, Kádár reappeared inside Soviet-occupied Hungary, announcing on the radio, from Szolnok, the formation of a new government led by him :

… Exploiting mistakes committed during the building of our people’s democratic system, the reactionary elements have misled many honest workers, and in particular the major part of our youth, which joined the movement out of honest and patriotic intentions…

The Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, acting in the interest of our people, working-class and country, requested the Soviet Army Command to help our nation smash the sinister forces of reaction and restore order and calm in the country…

Returning to Budapest in a Soviet armoured car, Kádár welcomed the Soviet troops; the new government could use their support in fighting the counter-revolutionary threat. He also promised economic and social reforms, as well as new agreements with the other Eastern bloc nations. 

Ambassador Lodge announced news of the invasion at the UN General Assembly, after a session of a session of the Security Council which began at 3 a.m. (US Eastern time). He asked the Security Council to pass the resolution that the United States had introduced the previous day. Although nine nations supported it, the USSR used its veto. The Security Council then called for an emergency session under the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution, which allowed the General Assembly to meet to consider issues when the Security Council was unable to maintain international security and peace. The GA met in a special session from 4 November, when it approved a resolution, submitted by the US, which called on the USSR to end military operations in Hungary and to withdraw its forces. The resolution also called on the Secretary-General to investigate the situation and to send observers to Hungary. Member states were asked to send relief supplies. After consulting with the Department of State, Minister Edward Wailes, appointed as Ambassador to Hungary in July, had finally arrived in Budapest on 2 November. He remained at the Legation but, at Washington’s direction, refused to present his credentials to the Kádár government as a protest against the arrest of Hungarian citizens who had visited the Legation on these days. The New York Times accused the Soviet Union of the foulest treachery and basest deceit known to man, and claimed that the invasion of Budapest was a monstrous crime against the Hungarian people that can never be forgiven or forgotten. 

004(to be continued…)

The Twin Crises of Autumn 1956: Suez & Hungary, part five   Leave a comment

‘About Turn’ to Turning Point:

31st October – 1st November

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For five days between 28th and 1st November a sense of normality began to return to Hungary. Following the ‘About Turn’ of the ceasefire and the Soviet withdrawal, The new Hungarian government introduced democracy, freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Cardinal Mindszenty, the leader of the Catholic Church was freed and returned to Buda on 31st. Pravda published the statement approved by the Kremlin the previous day implying respect for the independence and sovereignty of Hungary. This, however, was reversed the same day. After announcing a willingness to withdraw its forces completely from Hungarian territory, the Soviet Union changed its mind and moved to crush the revolution. The withdrawal of Soviet forces was all but completed on 31st, but almost immediately reports arrived of incursions by new forces across the eastern borders.

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Above: British paratroopers in the Suez Canal Zone, October 1956. The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion divided the West at a critical moment of the Hungarian Uprising.

The turning point for the Soviets came on 31st October with the news that British and French forces had attacked Egypt. The Israelis, in league with the British and French had launched an invasion of Egypt across the Sinai desert, which had been nationalised by General Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President earlier in the year. The Suez crisis proved a disastrous venture for the prestige of Britain and France in the Middle East. The military intervention was universally denounced, seen as the dying act of the imperialist powers. The US government was furious; it had not been consulted on the military operation and was opposed to it. With the presidential elections only a week away, Washington was now presented with two international crises simultaneously. This was, potentially, an even more disastrous situation for Hungary. Tom Leimdorfer remembers the flurry of worried phone conversations:

Everyone agreed that this was the worst possible news. The UN and the West would be preoccupied with Suez and leave Hungary to its fate. Still it seemed that the streets which were not the scenes of the worst battles were returning to some semblance of normality. Some trams and buses started to run, the railways were running, many people walked or cycled to their places of work, but still no school of course. There were food shortages, but some lorry loads arrived from the provinces and shops sold what they could. Over the next two days life started to have a faint semblance of normality. At the same time there were daily political bulletins with mixed news. The most sinister of these were reports of increasing Soviet troop movements.

The Suez affair did indeed distract attention from events in Hungary, just as they entered their most critical phase, with Nagy having restored order and set to consolidate the revolutionary gains of the previous eight days. It split the western camp and offered Moscow, with all eyes temporarily on Suez, a perfect cover for moving back into Budapest. At first, however, it had the opposite effect, delaying Moscow’s intervention in Hungary, for Khrushchev himself did not want to be compared to the “imperialist aggressors” in Egypt. After all, he had withdrawn Soviet troops from Poland when confronted by Gomulka; perhaps now he would rely on the Hungarian Prime Minister to keep Hungary in line.

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Meanwhile, the US found itself in an extraordinarily difficult  position, as Alex von Tunzelmann has recently reiterated in her book, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary and the Crisis that Shook the World:

… they were trapped between a lot of competing alliances. Britain and France had lied to them, and were continuing to lie, when it was perfectly obvious what was going on. It was also complicated because, although the US and Israel didn’t have quite as solid a relationship as they do now, it was still a pretty solid relationship.

It had therefore been widely expected in Britain, France and Israel that the US would not go against Israel in public, but in fact they did – extremely strongly. This was all happening in the week leading up to Dwight D Eisenhower’s second presidential election, too, and it was assumed that he wouldn’t stamp down on Israel because he would lose the election if he lost Jewish votes in the US. But actually Eisenhower was very clear that he didn’t mind about losing the election, he just wanted to do the right thing.

Back in Budapest, on 1 November, Nagy still felt the initiative was with him. He protested about the Soviet troop movements, declared Hungary’s neutrality, repudiated the Warsaw Pact, and cabled Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to ask that the question of Hungarian neutrality be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. This had no immediate result. The US had already gone against Britain and France at the UN, so the western alliance was under real danger of breaking up, just at the time when Hungary needed it to hold firm against Soviet aggression. The British and French had already been dubbed the obvious aggressors in Egypt, so any case against the Soviets would inevitably look weak and hypocritical. Besides, despite Nagy’s continued reassurances to the Soviet leadership stressing the desire for harmonious relations with the Soviet Union, the Hungarian government was seen to be going much further than the Poles had dared in their revolt: it effectively confronted the Soviets with an ultimatum to withdraw completely from Hungary, as it had from Austria the year before, so that the country would no longer be regarded as falling under its ‘sphere of influence’. To make matters more difficult for Khrushchev, Deng Xiaoping was visiting Moscow at the time as an official delegate of the Chinese Communist Party. He told Khrushchev that the Hungarian rebels were not only anti-Soviet but anti-Communist, and should not be tolerated. Under this competitive pressure, the politburo members urged a change of strategy on Khrushchev.

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Were the freedom fighters anti-Communist? In the early hours of 31 October, yet another, broader body, the Revolutionary Council of National Defence was formed at the defence ministry.  The Köztársaság Square lynchings of the AVH men had taken place on 30 October, and Imre Nagy clearly needed to assert the government’s control over the street-fighters. General Béla Király, aged forty-four, was elected to the Council and designated Military Commander of Budapest, taking over the organisation of a National Guard from the Budapest police chief, Colonel Sándor Kopácsi. His appointment was initially opposed by Gyula Varadi, who had been one of the judges who had passed a death sentence on Király in 1952, when he had been ‘found guilty’ of spying for the Americans, a charge which he continued to vehemently deny to Varadi’s face. Király’s task was to integrate and thereby gain control over the street-level civilian armed fighters.  The first formal, full meeting of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee, or new National Guard, took place on the 31 October at the Kilián Barracks, although its operations were based at Deák Square in the city centre. By all accounts, the meeting was a stormy one. Király later wrote that:

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Above all, the freedom fighters were highly suspicious of anyone whom they did not know personally or who had not fought on their side. They feared having the fruits of victory snatched from them by political machinations… The freedom fighters were easy prey to rumours of saboteurs in hiding, Stalinist counter-revolutionary activity, and so forth… (they) didn’t consider the Ministry of Defence entirely trustworthy… they weren’t prepared to put the strategic and military leadership of the freedom-fighting forces into the hands of the Defence Ministry.

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Pál Maleter, famous for his role at the Kilián barracks the week before, was also made Deputy Defence Minister on 31 October, but at the meeting at the barracks that day, some of the rebel leaders had serious criticisms and doubts about both him and Béla Király. On 1 November, Gergely Pongrátz, leader of the ‘Corvin Passage’ group of freedom fighters emerged from the Corvin Cinema building, where mass had been celebrated, to find units of the Hungarian Army taking away the destroyed Soviet tanks, armoured vehicles and other equipment  which the insurgents had been using as barricades. Surprised and angry, he gave the order for this to stop. Around midday Király phoned him, asking why Pongrátz had countermanded his orders, justifying them by arguing that the Soviets would not finally withdraw from the country unless they could take all of their military equipment with them, including that which had been damaged or destroyed. He ordered Pongrátz to permit their removal, but Pongrátz answered that, in view of the reports which were reaching him that the Soviets were re-entering rather than leaving the country, the barricades would have to stay. Apparently, he told Király:

I am not prepared to accept any order from anyone which endangers the success of the revolution in any way.

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Of course, the propagandists and ‘historians’ of the post-’56 Kádár era were at pains to smear the “Corvin gang” as consisting of “riff-raff” and “criminals and prostitutes” who were “under the leadership of Horthyite officers and fascists”. However, Béla Király, himself becoming a noted historian in the USA, continued to assert that the Hungarian Uprising was “not an anti-Communist revolution” well into the current century (he died in 2009, aged 97). As he pointed out in an exchange with an American magazine in 1983,

Imre Nagy was a Communist. Imre Nagy remained a member of the Central Committee of the ‘renewed’ Communist Party (HSWP). They were fighting against ‘men of blood’, against the secret police – but not against the Communist Party. It was for democracy, yes. It was against totalitarianism, yes. 

Nevertheless, there were still elements outside the control of the central government. József Dudás, a freelance revolutionary, formed a private army on 1 November. He had risen to prominence late in the revolution, when he had addressed a crowd of several hundred in Széna Square on 28 October. The following day, Dudás and his supporters took over the Szabad Nép (Free People) newspaper building, headquarters of the main public mouthpiece of the ruling party, the ‘central paper of the Hungarian Workers’ Party’, as it proclaimed on its masthead. The freedom fighters gave themselves the title of Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee and started to issue their own paper, Fuggetlenség (Independence) from the 30th. The party journalists were not, however, prevented from producing its paper, the newly-named Népszabadság (People’s Freedom), from 1 November onwards, another clear sign that the HNRC did not regard itself as anti-Communist.

What disturbed many people was that the first editions of Fuggetlenség carried headlines indicating that there should be no acceptance or recognition of the Nagy coalition government. This came on 30th, two days after the turnaround, when fighting had all but ceased throughout the city and when many people were hopeful that the government had started on a new course.  Despite these differences, splits and tensions, the documentary sources also reveal that the Communist Party leadership remained solid in its support for the revolution. On the 31st, the previously ruling Hungarian Workers’ Party was dissolved and the formation of a new party, The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party was announced. At the same time, other political parties from the 1945-1946 era were revived, and free trade unions began to be formed.

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Early in the morning on 1 November, the Soviet retrenchment began with the surrounding of Ferihegy airport and other airfields in the country. This came even before Nagy’s declaration of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality. What soured the general optimism still further was that not only were the Soviet troops not leaving the country, but that more were actually entering the country and heading for Budapest. At first the government wanted to prevent this information from leaking out, presumably to avoid creating panic and to leave time for diplomatic contacts. The Soviet explanation, when it came, was rather strange. Yuri Andropov, Moscow’s Ambassador in Budapest, maintained that whatever Soviet troop movements were taking place in Hungary were to assist in the overall withdrawal of Soviet forces. Andropov was called to Parliament in the late afternoon to receive the news of the country’s new status of neutrality. It was on this occasion that János Kádár, as Foreign Minister, joined Nagy in severely criticising the Soviet troop manoeuvres, threatening Yuri Andropov, that, if they resorted to any further use of arms, he would fight the Russian tanks with his ‘bare hands’ if necessary. The same day, the radio broadcast an announcement by the newly-formed HSWP:

We demand that János Kádár, as temporary chief of the Party, should publicly, immediately and without delay, call upon the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and the fraternal People’s Democracies, to make them see that the Hungarian Communist Party is now fighting for its life and survival, that it can only survive in the new situation if it serves solely the interest of the Hungarian people.

Kádár’s response came in a speech, broadcast later that day, praising the glorious uprising of our people in which they have achieved freedom… and independence for the country. He went on:

Without this there can be no socialism. We can safely say that the ideological and organisational leaders who prepared this uprising were recruited from your ranks. Hungarian Communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petöfi Circle, thousands and thousands of workers and peasants, and veteran fighters who had been imprisoned on false charges, fought in the front line against Rákosite despotism and political hooliganism…

Either the Hungarian democratic parties will have enough strength to stabilise our achievements or we must face an open counter-revolution.

By the time this was broadcast, however, Kádár had disappeared, only to return three days later in the wake of the second Soviet intervention. Perhaps, by this stage, Kádár was already conflicted, not simply over Nagy’s declarations of independence, but also due to the shooting of one of his closest friends, Imre Mező,  by street rebels two days earlier. Historian Tibor Huszár says that the news about Mező certainly affected Kádár:

Mező wasn’t simply a tried and tested comrade-in-arms, he was possibly his only friend. In the evening of the previous day they had met each other at the Köztársaság tér Party Headquarters.

Kádár didn’t reveal this openly at the time, and it wasn’t until one of his last interviews that he affirmed that it was because of the events in that square of 30th that he decided to abandon the Nagy government. More clues as to his thinking on 1 November come from an interview with an Italian journalist, conducted on the same day, in which he gave details of what he described as his Third Line. Asked what kind of Communism he represented, he answered:

The new type, which emerged from the Revolution and which does not want to have anything in common with the Communism of the Rákosi-Hegedüs-Gerö group.

Asked if this new Communism was of the Yugoslav or Polish type, he answered:

Our Communism is Hungarian. It is a sort of “third line”, with no connection to Titoism nor to Gomulka’s Communism… It is Marxism-Leninism, adapted to the particular requirements of our country, to our difficulties and to our national problem. It is not inspired either by the USSR nor by any other types of Communism… it is Hungarian National Communism. This “third line” originated from our Revolution during the course of which… numerous Communists fought at the side of students, workers and the people.  

Asked whether his Communism would be developed along democratic lines, he answered:

That’s a good question. There will be an opposition and no dictatorship. This opposition will be heard because it will have the national interests of Hungary at heart and not those of international Communism.

Despite the ambivalence of some of his answers, there is still nothing explicit in them about why his ‘third line’ might be considered closer to Moscow’s than that of Warsaw or Belgrade. If anything, the reverse would seem to be the case, unless by national problem he was referring to the difficulties in containing ‘nationalist’ forces and tendencies within the revolution. We do not know exactly when the interview was given, but neither does it contain any implied criticism of Nagy’s declarations of independence. So, what happened to Kádár on the evening of 1 November, when he was last seen approaching the Soviet Embassy? That Kádár changed sides during these days is not in dispute, but exactly how, when and why have never been fully clarified. According to Tibor Huszár’s 2001 biography of him it seems likely that Ferenc Münnich, on the initiative of Yuri Andropov, suggested that they go to the Soviet embassy for talks. Kádár was in parliament, discussing Hungary’s declaration of neutrality with the Chinese ambassador. He then left the building without telling anyone there, including his wife. The two men did not enter the embassy, however, but were taken away to the Soviet air base at Tököl, just south of the city. From there, they were flown to Moscow. What we do not know is whether he had already changed his mind about the way things were going in Budapest, or whether he was persuaded to do so in Moscow. There is no real documentary evidence.

Despite the claims of some that he had already changed his mind after the bloodbath of 30th, others have implied that Kádár’s defection was not perhaps so premeditated, pointing to the fact that he took no winter coat with him when he left the parliament building. Who would go to Moscow at that time of year with just a light jacket? Perhaps he was, after all, only expecting to go for talks at the Soviet Embassy. If he was already set on the course of denouncing the revolution as having become a counter-revolution, his speech in parliament and his radio broadcast would seem to be astounding in their level of deception. Then there is the matter of his support for the move to neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. According to György Lukács, of the members of the Party central committee, only Zoltán Szántó and himself opposed withdrawal from the Pact. Despite later assertions that Kádár did or did not support withdrawal, it seems that, at the time, few people, if any, suspected that Kádár had changed sides, or was about to do so. Why else would Imre Nagy continue to include him in his government after the cabinet reshuffle of 3 November, two days after his disappearance? That might rather suggest that Nagy knew of Kádár’s secret negotiations in Moscow, perhaps even approved of them, regarding Kádár, his Foreign Minister, as acting on his behalf.

Just before 8 p.m. on 1 November, Nagy himself went on the radio to announce to the public the momentous news of neutrality:

The Hungarian National Government… giving expression to the undivided will of the Hungarian millions declares the neutrality of the Hungarian People’s Republic. The Hungarian people, on the basis of independence and equality and in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter, wishes to live in true friendship with its neighbours, the Soviet Union, and all the peoples of the world. The Hungarian  people desire the consolidation and further development of its national revolution without joining any power blocs. The century-old dream of the Hungarian people is thus being fulfilled.

At the same time, the government forbade military forces from resisting the Soviet troops at Ferihegy airport and all the other Hungarian airfields.

It has been argued that the 1 November declaration of neutrality was the trigger which set off the Soviet invasion three days later. From the Soviet perspective, this may well have been the case, but the Nagy government saw it as a reaction to Soviet troop movements already underway, a means of undermining their legitimacy, and a form of deterrence by calling on the defensive support of the United Nations for a small, independent nation. As we now know, however, the decision to invade had already been taken in the Kremlin the day before, 31 October, the same day that the ‘liberal’ Soviet declaration of 30th was published in Pravda. Notes taken at the Soviet Party Presidium on 31 October indicate that the about-turn was initiated by Khrushchev himself, on the grounds of international prestige against the back-drop of the Suez Crisis. No doubt under pressure from hard-liners in the politburo, he had exchanged his early view of occupying higher moral ground for a conviction that, as he is quoted as saying:

If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English and French – the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part…  

There may have been some discussion and debate to bring about such a rapid change of hearts and minds, even given the interests of Soviet Communism in the world. Khrushchev claimed in his memoirs that we changed our minds back and forth. It is highly unlikely, however, that they had, at the forefronts of their minds, the well-being of the Hungarian working class and future of the Hungarian people. More influential were the reports of hooligan elements in the lynchings and shootings of 30 October. Certainly, Nagy’s declaration of neutrality had no deterrent  impact on the planned invasion. On 1 November, the decision taken, Khrushchev travelled to Brest, where he met Polish leaders and told them of the imminent intervention in Hungary.

(to be continued… )

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